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in

a

his

to

denying his motion because

contends that the district
d

to

court improperly determined the police officer had a reasonable suspicion to
a traffic stop for a dog sniff

the initial purpose of

stop was complete.

known to the officer were insufficient to establish a

that the

suspicion of criminal activity. Due to the unlawfully prolonged stop in
Fourth Amendment,

violation

court erred by

that the

failing to suppress the evidence obtained from the subsequent search of the vehicle.

22, 2014,
§ 37-2732B(a)(1 )(B)
pounds). (R.,

hearing,

a

him over

court

, pp.22, 25-26.) The State filed an

Information charging Mr. Kelley with trafficking in marijuana. (R., pp.23-24.)
These

arose out
, p.70.)

a traffic stop and search of a vehicle driven by
21,

4,

7:17

.,

Sheriffs Office

Detective Kyle Moore observed a 2005 Toyota with a Nebraska license plate on
Interstate 84 (hereinafter, 1-84). (R.,

) He estimated the vehicle's speed was 85

miles per hour in an 80 miles per hour speed zone. (R., p.70.) Detective Moore
with his

car

was

1

83

A, Elmore

provided to him (Def.'s

insurance and

was not

r.

that Mr. Kelley

(R., p.70.)

"avoiding

it "was summer

by him visibly

(R., p.70.)

contact, and a

Mr. Kelley was "slightly shaking"

that it was not
" (R., p.70;

Vol. 1, 1 p.12,

1

also

8.)

(Tr. Vol. I,

(See
In

1,

1

nervous behavior."

Detective
33,

19,

1-p.34, L.5.)

did

any

of a stolen vehicle (Tr. Vol. I, p.39, Ls.6-20.)

After making contact with Mr. Kelley, Detective Moore returned to his patrol car
and requested dispatch to check the driver's status and confirm warrants. (R., p.70;

1 There are two transcripts on appeal. The first, cited as Volume I, contains the
suppression hearing and entry of plea hearing. The second, cited as Volume II, contains
the sentencing hearing.

2

1

I,

1

nervous

L 1.)

four minutes after the first encounter. (R, p.70.) Detective

m.,

Kelley and

I,

up

more

a

1

owner as his
name. (R.,

Mr.

owner

's

16, L.20, p.34, L 1

Elmore County
L.1

35,

that his

.)

1n

was
to

in

(R., pp.7071.)

but
, pp.70-71;
l,
that

was

I, p.16,

Office

6,
to

a

once he

area. (R.,

3.) Detective Moore did not see anything

the passenger

compartment to suggest a long road trip, such as luggage. (R, p.71, Tr. Vol. I, p.15,

·17-22.) The vehicle had a

however. (Tr. Vol. I, p.35,

3

1-23.) This second

car.

a
.)

.)

come

I, p.38,

(Tr.

1
Mr. Kelley for the traffic

Moore determined at this time that he was not going to
(R., p.71; Tr.
his
was still detaining
"

1.)

"that the

had changed." (R., p.71.)

nn~~=~~····~···~athe

I, p.38,

after hearing back from dispatch. (Tr. Vol. I, p.18, Ls.3-6.)
11

'"''"' ..

0

returned to Mr. Kelley's

for

7:28 p.m.,

after the initial stop. (R., p.71.)
investigating

he was no

initial purpose of the
I, p.42,

the time of

0.)

if there

was
drugs or
in

(R., p.71.)

am I free to

, p.71.) Detective Moore then
again

am I

to search

to leave?" (R.,

to Detective Moore's observation of
informed him that he was

and

Kelley

.)
nervousness,

Kelley's
detain

a

for a sniff

around the exterior of the vehicle. (R., p.71.) Detective Moore directed Mr. Kelley to exit
the vehicle, and one of the back-up officers frisked him. (R., p. 71.) Detective Moore
depioyed the dog at 7:29 p.m. (R., p.71.) The dog alerted at 7:32 p.m. (R., p.71.)

4

38.)
a

suppress and took the matter
p

1
a

advisement. (R., pp.50-52; see generally Tr. VoL I,

The district

1,

on

a

sniff. (R.,

an

Motion to

Order Denying
Mr. Kelley

to a plea
of trafficking in

in

. (R., pp.78-81;

the district

of I

I, p.69, Ls.9-12.)
his motion

guilty to an

1)(A) (at

§

Kelley reserved his right
(R., pp.85, 89; Tr. Vol. I,

p.63,

with

years

1
(R.,

judgment. (R.,

a timely

from the

01.)

In the district court's initial order, it noted that it found and "[t]he parties agreed" that
the three videos of the traffic stop were "unusable." (R., p.55 n.1.) In the corrected
order, the district court revised its footnote to state that it found the videos "mostly
unintelligible and unhelpful to deciding the case" because "[t]he wind drowned out much
of the conversation." (R., p.69 n.1 .)
2

5

6

of

a

that
th,::,
\.!IV"

to

speculation, which is insufficient to justify the prolonged stop

a mere hunch or
Fourth

stop, Mr. Kelley submits

Due

district court

his motion to

Court uses a bifurcated standard to review a district court's order on a
to suppress. State v. Danney, 153 Idaho 405,
156 Idaho 568,

(Ct. App.

(2012); see also

(same). The

V.

of
"

of

1

are
v. Munoz, 1

109,111 (2013) (citing

de nova.

v.

Idaho 121, 127 (2010)).

When reviewing the district court's determination of reasonable suspicion, "the
appellate court 'should

care both

findings of historical fact only

clear

error and to give due weight to inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges
and local law enforcement officers."' Id (quoting Munoz, 149 Idaho at 127). "The
accepts the trial court's findings of fact if supported by substantial evidence." State v.

Watts, 142 Idaho 230, 234 (2005). The Court "has defined 'substantial evidence as such
reievant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion; it is more

7

"'

,1

V.

is

C.
Prolong The Traffic Stop For A Dog Sniff Of The Vehicle
Fourth Amendment of the United

protects citizens from

"State v. Hansen, 138 Idaho 791, 796 (2003). "Article

17

I,

Idaho Constitution nearly identically guarantees that '[t]he right of

people to

effects against

secure in their persons,

unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated."' State v. Green, 158 Idaho
884, 886 (2015) (alteration in original). "Traffic stops constitute seizures under the

Morgan, 1

Idaho

112 (quoting
are

officer's
commit, a

articulable suspicion

a

v. Henage, 143 Idaho
when

an

, or is about to

"Id.

"[A]n officer may stop a vehicle to investigate if there is a reasonable and
articulable suspicion that the vehicle is being driven contrary

traffic laws." State v.

Edwards, 158 Idaho 323, 324 (Ct. App. 2015) (citing United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S.
411, 417 (1981 ); State v. Flowers, 131 Idaho 205, 208 (Ct App. 1998)). Mr. Kelley does
not challenge Detective Moore's initial stop of the vehicle. ( See R., p. 72.)
"A drug dog sniff may be performed during a traffic stop without violating the
Fourth Amendment if the duration of the stop is not extended or if any extension of the

8

"

135

"

an
1609, 1615 (2015). In contrast to

ordinary inquires

sniff "is a measure aimed

to a traffic stop, a
wrongdoing."'

ord

, 40-41 (2000)).

original) (quoting Indianapolis v.
a

suspicion because a

cannot prolong the

during a routine

"is not fairly characterized as
stop. Id
"Reasonable suspicion must be based on
that can

v. Bishop, 1

1

from

Idaho

112

804, 811

law enforcement training

Danney, 153 Idaho

articulable facts and

410, but "[t]he officer,

inferences

facts

"

must be able to articulate

something more than an 'inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch."' United

States v. Sako/ow, 490 U

1, 7 (1989); see also Morgan, 1

"The test for reasonable suspicion is based on

Idaho at 112 (same).

totality of the circumstances known

to the officer at or before the time of the stop." Morgan, 154 Idaho

112.

The Court of Appeals recently held in State v. Perez-Jungo, 156 Idaho 609
(Ct. App. 2014), that reasonable suspicion of a "specific crime" is not required under the
Fourth Amendment:

9

a

61
initiation

by

V.

U.S. 1, 19, 28-29 (1968). "Thus, evidence may not be introduced if it was
by means of a
"'"'"'!J"'

search which were

reasonably related in

to the justification for their initiation." Id. at 29. "Where a person is detained, the

scope of detention must be carefully tailored to its underlying justification." Perez-Jungo,
156 Idaho at 617; see also Florida v. Royer; 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983).
Consequently, where the person is detained in a prolonged traffic stop, the scope
of that detention must carefully tailored to
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.
drug-related criminal

underlying justification: the officer's
officer must have a reasonable suspicion

if

deploying a dog to detect the odor of

specifically for
. To

a dog sniff without a reasonable

suspicion of drug-related criminal activity would be an unreasonable expansion of the
justification for the seizure. See State v. Aguirre, 141 Idaho 560, 564 (Ct. App. 2005)
(holding that the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights were violated by officers
prolonging stop for a dog sniff without reasonable suspicion of a "drug-related offense").
Although it is not required under Perez-Jungo for the officer to suspect a specific crime,
i.e., drug possession versus trafficking, the officer must reasonably suspect that some
drug-related criminal activity afoot to justify a seizure for the specific purpose of a dog
sniff.

10

In

he

of

concluded his

traffic

." (R., p.75.)

court identified the issue as whether "Detective Moore had
upon resolution of the initial justifications for the stop, to continue the detention to
investigation other possible crimes." (R., p.74.) The district court determined, "based on
totality of the circumstances, Detective Moore had a reasonable suspicion to
continue to detain Kelley for further investigation." (R., pp.75-76.) Mr. Kelley takes issue
with one of the district court's factual findings and its determination of reasonable
suspicion.

1.

"Drug Corridor" Findings
facts
suspicion was that

determination
was traveling on a "known corridor for drugs"

from west coast states to "Nebraska specifically." (R., p.75.) The district court also found
that "l-84 between Oregon (a source state) and, ultimately, Nebraska, is a known
corridor." (R., p.70.) Mr. Kelley asserts that these findings are not supported by
substantial and competent evidence in the record.

entirety of Detective Moore's

testimony on this subject provides:
Q. [By the prosecutor] One additional question. Do you recall - the

registration for the vehicle, where was it registered to?
A. The state was Nebraska. I believe Omaha.

11

common
drugs from a source state. Commonly in our area it is the
coast state
to the Midwest. So I knew it to
a consumer state for narcotics generally
speaking.
And based on your training
a source state?

actual experience is Oregon generally

A. Yes, it is.
(Tr. Vol. I, p.27, Ls.7-24.) In light of this brief testimony, the district court's factual
finding that Mr. Kelley was on a "known corridor" from west coast states to "Nebraska
specifically" was in error. (R., pp.71, 75.) Detective Moore's testimony does not provide
any indication that "Nebraska specifically" was the consumer state for this precise travel
route. Rather, Detective Moore testified that Nebraska was a consumer state "generally
based solely on the fact that it happens to be in a
is

no

in the Midwest. What

on this

district court's finding that 1-84 specifically is

"

is no
known drug

" (R., p.70.) Rather, according to Detective Moore's testimony, all individuals
who happen to be traveling from any west coast state to the Midwest on any road in
Idaho are on this drug corridor and subject to investigation. Mr. Kelley disputes the
district court's finding

traveling from any west coast state to "Nebraska specifically"

via 1-84 is a "known corridor for drugs.

findings are not supported by the

evidence in the record.

12

a

stop
, p.75.) Therefore,

this point forward, Detective Moore prolonged the traffic stop

an unrelated purpose, which must be
criminal activity. Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1615; Perez-Jungo, 156 Idaho
141 Idaho

at 617;

564.

Detective Moore did not have a reasonable suspicion to prolong the traffic stop
a dog sniff based on the information known to him prior to the second encounter.
Moore had called for back-up after

first

due to Mr. Kelley's

nervous behavior (his lack of eye contact, trembling, and pulsing carotid artery).
, p. 70; Tr. Vol. I,

1

1

1

behavior, standing alone, is

L.1.)

for reasonable suspicion.
71

726 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting

268 F.3d
nervousness alone

no
and holding

not support reasonable

amended by United States v. Chavez-

Valenzuela, 279 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2002), overruled on other grounds by Muehler v.

U.S. 93 (2005).

person's nervous behavior during a police encounter is of

"limited

suspicion

it is common for

people to exhibit signs of nervousness when confronted with law enforcement
regardless of criminal activity." State v. Gibson, 141 Idaho 277, 285-86 (Ct. App. 2005);
see also State v. Bly, No. 42637, 2016 WL 72522, at *2 (Ct. App. Jan.

that "iawful,

is

13

2016) (noting

a

in

nervous

a
suspicion to justify

prolonged

Similar to nervousness, the "known

finding 3 also is of little significance. At its core, this finding suggests that every
individual traveling on 1-84 from the west coast to the Midwest is a suspected drug
This is not a "specific, articulable" fact or rational inference thereof on which to
a determination of reasonable suspicion. See Morgan, 154 Idaho

112. A driver's

nervous behavior during an initial police encounter coupled with an out-of-state vehicle
traveling west

east on an

is insufficient for a reasonable suspicion of

drug-related criminal activity. Moreover, none of the other relevant facts support a
determination of reasonable suspicion. Detective Moore did not observe that Mr. Kelley
was

by drugs or alcohol. (Tr. Vol. I, p.12,
33,

12-p.13, L.9, p.13, L.23-p.1

1

was friendly. (Tr.

L.3.) Mr. Kelley

L.1,

I, p.36,

Moore's requests for his driver's

registration, and

, p.70;

's

A, Elmore County

Sheriff's Office Narrative.) The vehicle did not look stolen. (Tr. Vol. I, p.39, Ls.6-20.) In
light of the totality of the circumstances,
the second encounter does not

known to Detective Moore prior

a

suspicion of drug-related criminal

activity to justify the prolonged stop.

3

Mr. Kelley assumes in arguendo that this finding is supported by the record.
14

3.

Detective Moore Did Not Have A Reasonable Suspicion Of Drug-Related
Criminal Activity When He Approached The Vehicle For The Third
Encounter

Assuming
encounter, 4

prolonged

traffic stop

prior to the

Moore still lacked a reasonable suspicion of drug-related

activity. By this time, Detective Moore had learned of Mr. Kelley's "suspicious story."

(R., pp.70-71, 75.) Mr. Kelley continued to show signs of extreme nervousness (which
is not unreasonable considering that a police officer continued to detain and question
him without issuing a traffic ticket,

purpose of the stop. 5) Detective Moore saw no

indicators of a road trip in the passenger compartment, but the vehicle had a trunk.

(R., p.71, Tr. Vol. I, p.15, Ls.17-22, p.35, Ls.21-23.) Detective Moore also learned that
Mr. Kelley was "free and clear-no warrants." (R., p. 71.) The vehicle had insurance, and
the vehicle's registration did not come back stolen. (Tr. Vol. I, p.38, Ls.10-12,

1-

22.) In essence, Detective Moore knew that a nervous individual with a valid driver's
license was driving a registered, insured vehicle from Oregon to Nebraska on the
interstate. The fact that Mr. Kelley had an imprudent travel arrangement with a friend
does not add

support to the

of a reasonable suspicion of drug-related

criminal activity.
Indeed, Detective Moore provided no clarification as

if any, suspected

criminal activity necessitated his further investigation. He simply testified: "I was
furthering my investigation. I had reason to believe there was more going on," "there

The State conceded at the suppression hearing that Detective Moore's initial
investigation was over when he approached the vehicle for the third time. (Tr. Vol. I,
12)
! .
P.vf::.5 , L:S."f5 Detective Moore told Mr. Kelley during the first encounter that he was not going to
write him a ticket for the traffic infraction. (Tr. Vol. I, p.36, Ls.8-12.)
4

A

15

if

"I was

an
on." That is

hunch or 'inchoate and

on the part of the

officer. Bishop, 1

Idaho at 811

(quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 329 (1990)); State v. Cerino, 141 Idaho 736,
was no

(Ct. App. 2005)). Recently, in Bly, the Court of Appeals held

suspicion for a detention

"articulated no basis

defendant's conduct was "consistent with criminal activity." 2016 WL

justifying why"

The Court of Appeals

that the

to articulate

something more than "a hunch based on proximity" or just "strange and suspicious"
to support a reasonable inference that
a

had committed or was

Id.

in Bly, Detective

suspicion

criminal

a dog

from Detective
come
traffic stop
180, 184 (Ct.

light

government's unconstitutional

a dog

vehicle "would not
in prolonging the

without reasonable suspicion. State v. Wigginton, 142 Idaho

2005). Due to the unlawfully prolonged stop,

the district court erred by denying

submits that

Kelley's motion to suppress. See Wong Sun v.

United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963) (evidence obtained through unconstitutional

poiice conduct subject to exclusion); Bishop, 146 Idaho at 810-11 (same).

16

reverse

21st
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